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I. INTRODUCTION
Determining the contours of the United States’ trust responsibilities to the various Indian tribes has been a path marked with inconsistencies, inequities, and enough complex legal reasoning to make
one’s head spin. While it might have been hoped that United States v.
Navajo Nation (Navajo II)1 would clear up some of the inconsistencies,
it should be clear by this time that no such help is forthcoming.
Rather this case continues in the tradition of a “malleability that has
allowed the doctrine [of federal trust responsibility] to be repeatedly
transformed over the years, leaving a conflicted legacy for tribes and
their members.”2 On this analysis, the future decisions of the Supreme Court rest less on precedent and more on the individual actors
involved and the social and historical contexts in which they act.3
This Note will attempt to add to the already large body of scholarly
work4 examining the controversy at various stages of decision and argue that the case represents a continuation of principles iterated in
the dissenting opinion of United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II).5
In 1993, the Navajo Nation filed a lawsuit—Navajo Nation v.
United States6—alleging breach of fiduciary duties for actions taken
by the Secretary of the Interior during the approval process for coal
lease amendment negotiations between the tribe and Peabody Holding
Company. A protracted legal battle began, ultimately requiring two
1. 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009).
2. Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and
the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 309 (2009).
3. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 8 (1997) (arguing for the applicability of “critical legal theory” to analysis
of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in tribal matters).
4. See, e.g., Curtis G. Berkey, Rethinking the Role of the Federal Trust Responsibility in Protecting Indian Land and Resources, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1069 (2006);
Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine:
Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2005);
Gregory C. Sisk, The Indian Trust Doctrine After the 2002–2003 Supreme Court
Term: Yesterday and Today: Of Indians, Breach of Trust, Money, and Sovereign
Immunity, 39 TULSA L. REV. 313 (2003); Jesse Cook, Note, Navajo Nation v.
United States: Determining When Native American Tribes Can Sue the United
States Within a Trust Relationship, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 233
(2002); Kimberly C. Perdue, Note, The Changing Scope of the United States’ Trust
Duties to American Indian Tribes: Navajo Nation v. United States, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. 487 (2009); Jason Stone, Note, Ubi Jus Incertum, Ibi Jus Nullum: Where the
Right is Uncertain, There Is No Right: United States v. Navajo Nation, 27 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 149 (2006).
5. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
6. 46 Fed. Cl. 217 (2000).
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Supreme Court opinions to finally resolve that the tribe’s claims for
monetary relief lacked jurisdiction under statutory and case law provided by the Indian Tucker Act,7 United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I),8 and Mitchell II.9 In one
sense the Supreme Court’s original decision in 2003 in Navajo I10 “left
no room” for a decision in favor of the tribe on remand.11 However, in
another sense the Court’s decision failed to adequately address the
importance (or even possibility) of government control over the tribe’s
natural resources due to the Secretary of the Interior’s approval role
in the lease amendment process unless the majority’s contention that
control over tribal coal does not matter is taken seriously.12 If this is
indeed the case, and control of tribal resources does not matter in
claims alleging government mismanagement of tribal resources, then
claims in the Mitchell II vein will be limited to those claims addressing the government’s management of tribal resources. These claims
will be further restricted by the current trends in legislative and bureaucratic enactments purporting to enhance tribal self-determination
while still leaving the government in a powerful approval role with
respect to those resources.13
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Navajo II and
evaluates the Court’s opinion in light of the previous “path-marking
precedents”14 in Mitchell I and II. Part II provides background on the
Indian Tucker Act, Mitchell I and II, and the entirety of the procedural and decisional history of Navajo II. Part III argues that the
Court’s opinion in Navajo II represents at least a partial rejection of
the reasoning of Mitchell II and shares some commonalities with the
dissenting opinion in that case. Part III also addresses the possibility
of government control of tribal resources through the Secretary of Interior’s approval role in lease amendments of this type, and it also
discusses whether Mitchell II represents for this Court a decision that
only extensive management of tribal resources can support Indian
Tucker Act jurisdiction. Part IV concludes by arguing that once the
case is placed in context, the decision represents a continuation of the
judiciary’s conflicting holdings regarding tribal resources. However,
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (originally enacted as the Indian Claims Commission Act
of 1946, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1055, 1057).
8. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
9. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
10. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
11. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1555 (2009).
12. Id. at 1557–58.
13. See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1077–98 (2008) (discussing recent legislation that increases
tribal self-governance while purporting to require less secretarial approval, yet
conditions this minimal approval on meeting many statutory conditions).
14. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 503.
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these holdings amount to little more than political choices clothed in
legal reasoning, and due to the large amount of money at stake, both
for the government and for energy consumers in the region, the Court
chose to turn a blind eye to the actual control inherent in an “approval
only” role assumed by the government.15
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Indian Tucker Act

Although Navajo II examines a complicated array of statutes and
regulations, at its heart the case is strictly about jurisdiction. Since
the Navajo were suing the United States, the first order of business is
the same as in any other suit against the federal government—finding
out whether the government has waived its sovereign immunity. In
the case of most claimants, waiver of sovereign immunity is accomplished through the Tucker Act16 and allows the United States to be
sued in the United States Court of Federal Claims for any claim
“founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.”17 The purpose of the Tucker
Act was to relieve the growing burden placed on Congress to provide
individualized relief to persons harmed by government action through
private bills by granting jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims.18
The Indian Tucker Act,19 as it is colloquially known, serves to accomplish the same ends as the Tucker Act with respect to suits by
Indian tribes. The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does
not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States
15. Several scholars have agreed that the legal reasoning in Navajo I is correct. See,
e.g., Cook, supra note 4, at 240–43 (arguing that “a fiduciary relationship . . . does
not mean that every claim against the United States is valid”); Stone, supra note
4, at 163–65 (arguing that Navajo I was decided correctly). This is also true of
Navajo II, but in some sense this forgets that there is no “right answer” in legal
reasoning. Since “[t]he uncertainties and imperfections in law force judges to
choose what the law ought to mean” there is a strong argument that the law
“ought” to have found a money-mandating duty in this case because of the blatantly unfair actions of the executive. LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 9 (7th ed. 2005).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359,
§ 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505).
17. Id.
18. The Court of Federal Claims originally heard cases and prepared draft private
bills. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612–14. The Tucker Act was a
“comprehensive measure by which claims against the United States [could] be
heard and determined” without the need for the private bill process. H.R. REP.
NO. 49-1077, at 1 (1886).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
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for money damages.”20 Individual claimants under the Tucker Act
must therefore find a substantive right in some other source of law.21
Since the Indian Tucker Act provides “jurisdiction [over] any claim . . .
which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if
the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group,”22 the analysis
is the same for the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act.
B.

The “Path-marking Precedents”
1.

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980)

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I)23 concerned the liability of
the United States for alleged mismanagement of timber on allotted
and tribal land, with an attempt to tie a money-mandating duty on the
government to the General Allotment Act of 1887.24 However, after a
lengthy discussion of the purpose and intent of the General Allotment
Act, the Court determined that the Act was not meant to impose
money-mandating trust duties on the government, even though the
Act expressly provided that the allotments were to be held “for the
period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the
Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made.”25
In the main, the Court determined that money damages were not
appropriate in light of the legislative history and purpose of the express trust language in the General Allotment Act. Since most of the
discussion relating to the trust language in the General Allotment Act
focused on the need to provide a safeguard against state taxation or
premature sale of allotted lands,26 the Court found that the trust language only created a limited trust relationship with respect to the allottees and the tribe and did not impose any obligations with respect
to the management of timber resources.27 Additionally, the Court
found support for this view in the subsequent acts of Congress “authorizing the harvesting and sale of timber on specific reservations.”28
In the last footnote of the majority opinion, however, the Court referred to the unresolved issue of whether there was merit to the claim
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
445 U.S. 535 (1980).
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C. starting at § 331).
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006)). Under § 2 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48
Stat. 984, 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 462 (2006)), the United States
held title to allotment lands indefinitely, Mitchell I, 463 U.S. at 541, so the express trust language arguably continued up to the time of the controversy.
Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 543–44.
Id. at 541–45.
Id. at 545.
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that a network of other statutes mandated money damages.29 The
Court explicitly mentioned that those statutes could be considered on
remand, but it did not seem to either require or approve the lower
court’s consideration of those statutes.30
The three-Justice dissent in Mitchell I, authored by Justice White,
argued that the General Allotment Act should be interpreted as mandating compensation.31 Of primary importance, the dissent would not
have looked beyond the text to the statutory purpose and history of
the Act, because the Act expressly used trust language, and principles
of construction giving words their ordinary meaning should control.32
Furthermore, even after considering the legislative history, the dissent viewed the policy embodied in the General Allotment Act to represent a continuation of “the trust status of Indian lands.”33
Therefore, the dissent thought it appropriate to apply the “hornbook
law” of trusts to find a damages remedy for the claimants.34
2.

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983)

On remand, the Court of Federal Claims did consider the network
of other statutes and regulations that the Supreme Court did not consider in Mitchell I, and, finding in favor of the tribe and its members,
the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the network imposed specific fiduciary duties that could fairly be interpreted as mandating
money damages for their breach.35 Relying on a network of statutes
pertaining to timber management, road building and rights of way,
government fees for management of Indian funds, and the regulations
promulgated under those statutes, the Court of Federal Claims held
that the threshold requirements of both the specificity of the United
States’ consent to suit and the propriety of money damages had been
met.36 In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed with Justice
Marshall again writing the majority opinion.37
a.

Majority Opinion

After describing the contours of the Indian Tucker Act in relation
to the case, the Court proceeded to discuss the case as one analytical
problem. Essentially, since the plaintiffs had presented specific statutes imposing duties on the United States, the only question remain29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 546 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 546–47 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 548 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973)).
Id. at 550.
Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Cl. Ct. 1981), aff’d, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
Id.
Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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ing was whether the statutes cited could “fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.”38 In developing this line of reasoning, the Court first discussed the level of management and control that the statutes and regulations provided, and it found them to be sufficiently comprehensive
and elaborate such that a fiduciary relationship necessarily arose.39
Once the Court was satisfied that fiduciary duties had attached, the
task of fairly interpreting the statutes as mandating money damages
was relatively easy. The Court’s analysis essentially boiled down to
the statement that “[g]iven the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the
breach of its fiduciary duties.”40
b.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Powell’s dissent attacked the majority opinion head on and
was explicitly concerned that the Court had overruled its previous decisions in Mitchell I and United States v. Testan.41 Interestingly, both
opinions focused on the proper interpretation of just how a court was
to interpret a statute as mandating money damages, with Justice
Powell contending that money damages are proper if the statute “ ‘in
itself . . . can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained.”42 Although not expressly brought out in his opinion, Justice Powell understood the logic
of the statement quite differently than the majority did with his inclusion of the condition that the statute “in itself” must mandate money
damages. This reading led Justice Powell to agree with the dissent in
the lower court that “[t]he federal power over Indian lands is so different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee . . . that caution
is taught in using the mere label of a trust plus a reading of Scott on
Trusts to impose liability on claims where assent is not unequivocally
expressed.”43 In reading the statutes facially only, Justice Powell was
unable to conclude that the statutes at issue fairly mandated monetary damages.44

38. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
39. Id. at 224–25.
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id. at 229, 231–32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 229 (emphasis added) (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 402).
43. Id. at 234 (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 283 (1981) (Nichols,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
44. Id. at 236.
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United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488
(2003)
1.

Facts and Procedural History

In February of 1964, the Navajo Nation entered into a coal lease
with the Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of certain coal on
tribal lands.45 While the original lease provided a very low royalty
rate, this rate was subject to revision under article VI of the lease by
the Secretary of the Interior or his delegate on the twentieth anniversary of the lease.46 However, the Secretary, never exercised this
power, and instead, in December of 1987, the Secretary approved
amendments to the lease that were negotiated by the parties.47 This
rate increase was arguably not the fair price for the Navajo Nation’s
coal, and in anticipation of the twentieth anniversary of the lease, the
tribe had started proceedings in the Department of the Interior (DOI)
to exercise the Secretary’s powers under article VI.48 In the first level
of review in the DOI, an initial decision was made to change the royalty rates to a percentage basis and that a rate of 20% was fair under
the circumstances.49 Peabody Coal Company appealed this decision,
but by the summer of 1985 it was generally known that the DOI
planned to deny Peabody’s appeal and uphold the 20% royalty.50
This possibility of an increase in the cost of coal led to concern
among the area’s utilities companies and resulted in several attempts
at ex parte communications with then-Secretary William P. Clark,
who flatly rejected all such meetings.51 By the time a decision on the
matter was imminent, Donald P. Hodel had taken over as Secretary of
the DOI, and Peabody Coal Company sent Secretary Hodel a letter in
July of 1985 urging him to postpone the decision to increase the royalty rate and to force the Navajo to return to the bargaining table.52
During the same month, Peabody retained Stanley Hulett, a former
high-level DOI employee and close friend of Hodel.53 The Court of
Federal Claims concluded that there was “little doubt” that Hulett
made ex parte contact with Hodel by using his personal connections
and that shortly thereafter Hodel signed a memorandum prepared by
45. Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 221 (2000), rev’d, 263 F.3d 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
46. Id. The original royalty rate was set at $0.375 per ton of coal produced. Id.
47. Id. The new royalty rate was set at 12.5%, which was the going rate for such
leases of federal lands generally. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Peabody Coal Company was the successor in interest of the lease at issue. Id.
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Peabody, instructing John Fritz, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, not to issue a decision in the royalty appeal.54
A short time later, and apparently to the confusion of the Federal
Court of Claims, the Navajo returned to the bargaining table and negotiated a lease amendment setting royalty rates at 12.5%.55 Although the amendments first failed to garner approval from the Tribal
Council, political changes in the Council eventually led to the acceptance of the negotiated agreement without change.56 The negotiated
agreement did not simply lower the royalty rate to 12.5%. It also affirmed the power of the tribe to tax and raised royalty rates to 12.5%
on two other coal leases that were not subject to revision by their
terms.57 Since the negotiated agreement also rested on subsequent
approval of the same rate on a joint coal lease with the Hopi, production resumed at the 12.5% rate for two years before the joint lease was
approved and the amendments to the lease were ripe for review by the
Secretary. Finally, at the end of 1987, the amendments were officially
forwarded to the DOI.58 The approval of these amendments was conducted under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA)59 and
was concluded during a relatively short time over Thanksgiving of
1987.60 The Navajo filed their action alleging breach of fiduciary duties on December 14, 1993, the sixth anniversary of the formal approval of the lease amendments by the DOI.61
The government initially claimed that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations, since the improper actions all occurred in 1985.
However, the Court of Federal Claims found the action timely, because the cause of action did not accrue until the course of conduct
culminating in the approval of the lease amendments was complete,
and further, because the Navajo Nation “was unaware, through no
fault of its own, of the July 1985 events.”62 It then remained for the
Court of Federal Claims to decide the motions for summary judgment
54. Id. at 222–23. This memorandum, described as “march or die” orders, was opposed by Mr. Fritz, who made no secret of his sympathies for the tribe. Mr. Fritz
resigned the same summer pursuant to an earlier decision. Id. at 223.
55. Id. at 223 (stating that “[t]he abrupt abandonment of their effort to have DOI set
a high royalty rate at the moment of its apparent success, and the Navajo Nation’s return to negotiations they had broken off and had steadfastly refused to
resume, defy explanation on this record”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 224. The recognition of the tribe’s power of taxation was arguably not a
concession of any kind, however, as the right had recently been established in
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
58. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 224.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)–(g) (2006).
60. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 224.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 225.
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brought by both sides with respect to claims for breach of trust.63 The
Court of Federal Claims was quite clear that it viewed the ex parte
contacts between Hodel and Hulett as breaches of basic fiduciary duties owed to the tribe.64 Even though the actions of Hodel were improper and might have tainted the entire approval process, these
breaches “[did] not themselves confer jurisdiction on [the] Court, nor
entitle plaintiff to money damages.”65 Rather, the recovery of money
damages was contingent on the conferral of jurisdiction by the Indian
Tucker Act66 and required the imposition of specific fiduciary duties
by some other substantive source of law, coupled with a violation of
those specific duties which Congress intended to remedy with a damages award.67
The IMLA could not, by its terms, “serve as a basis for jurisdiction,
[since] the trust responsibility must mandate particular monetary relief upon the basis of statute, treaty, or assumption by the government
of the task of managing economic assets.”68 Furthermore, a limited
trust duty, and even its breach, had been held not to impose monetary
damages standing on its own.69 The Court of Federal Claims then
examined whether the level of management and control of coal leases
under the IMLA would still support a claim for money damages under
Mitchell II and a continuum of cases between it and Mitchell I.70
Drawing from this continuum of cases,71 the Court of Federal Claims
held that the IMLA and regulations pursuant to it did not come within
the level of control or management that would grant the federal courts
jurisdiction to provide monetary relief.72

63. Id.
64. Id. at 226 (“There is no plausible defense for a fiduciary to meet secretly with
parties having interests adverse to those of the trust beneficiary, adopt the third
parties’ desired course of action in lieu of action favorable to the beneficiary, and
then mislead the beneficiary concerning these events.”).
65. Id. at 226–27.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
67. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 227.
68. Id. at 228.
69. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980)).
70. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 228, 230.
71. Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pawnee v. United States,
830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Wright v.
United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 54 (1994).
72. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 233–34 (“We find that the Secretary’s role in the
Navajo’s coal leasing—that is, his control or supervision of coal leasing—falls far
short of the detailed fiduciary responsibilities of Mitchell II, Pawnee, and Brown,
on the one hand, and is more akin to the general fiduciary responsibilities addressed in Mitchell I and Wright, on the other.”).
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,73
mainly taking issue with the conclusion of Court of Federal Claims
regarding the level of control exercised by the government under the
IMLA.74 This finding of control had its origin in the language of the
statute itself, which provided that “unallotted lands . . . may, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesmen
for such Indians.”75 Essentially the Federal Circuit reasoned that
since a lease could not be entered without the consent of the Secretary, the Secretary had the final authority over mineral leases, and
therefore the Secretary had the requisite level of control necessary to
satisfy Mitchell II.76 Since the Court of Federal Claims clearly found
a breach of fiduciary duties, the Federal Circuit held that the jurisdiction of the federal courts had been established under the Indian
Tucker Act.77 The concurrence in the case essentially agreed with the
majority opinion but felt that the majority failed to properly analyze
the breach of specific fiduciary duties imposed by the IMLA.78 Further, since the breach of specific fiduciary duties could only relate to
the approval of the lease, rather than the improper ex parte contact,
the concurrence suggested that only the damages suffered by the tribe
by a failure to carry out an economic analysis in the approval process
should have been awarded.79 The United States appealed the decision
of the Federal Circuit, and certiorari was granted.80
2.

Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that the tribe’s claim rested within the domain of Mitchell I, and
that since the IMLA did not create any rights or duties that would
subject the federal government to monetary damages, the Indian
Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.81 The
Court analyzed both the IMLA and the Indian Mineral Development
73. Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001) rev’d, 537
U.S. 488 (2003), remanded to 68 Fed. Cl. 805 (2005), rev’d, 501 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009).
74. Id. at 1331 (“Throughout the statute and its implementing regulations is seen the
pervasive control by the United States of the manner in which mineral leases are
sought, negotiated, conditioned, and paid, and the pervasive obligation to protect
the interests of the Indian tribes.”).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2006).
76. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1330–31.
77. Id. at 1333.
78. Id. at 1339 (Schall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 1340.
80. United States v. Navajo Nation, 535 U.S. 1111 (2002) (mem.).
81. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003), remanded to
68 Fed. Cl. 805 (2005), rev’d, 501 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1547
(2009).
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Act of 1982 (IMDA)82 but found that the IMDA did not apply because
it only applied to activities related to development of resources rather
than the leasing of those resources.83 The majority noted that Mitchell I and Mitchell II were the “path-marking precedents on the question of whether a statute or regulation (or combination thereof) ‘can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government.’”84
In determining whether the Indian Tucker Act conferred jurisdiction through the IMLA, the Court focused on “whether the IMLA and
its implementing regulations [could] fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation” rather than on the specific fiduciary duties imposed
or the breach of those duties.85 Since the IMLA did not impose the
level of detailed fiduciary duties that was found in Mitchell II, the
Court determined that monetary damages were not appropriate and
that “[t]he endeavor to align this case with Mitchell II rather than
Mitchell I, however valiant, [fell] short of the mark.”86 The Court also
found the argument that the IMLA more closely resembled the General Allotment Act (GAA) in Mitchell I persuasive, in that the purpose
found in the GAA was to enhance tribal self-determination, which was
also the purpose behind giving the Secretary a limited approval role in
the leasing of tribal coal.87 The Court also explicitly rejected the view
of the concurrence in the Federal Circuit that the approval function
implied any duty to conduct an economic analysis in conjunction with
the approval of the lease amendments.88
3.

Dissenting Opinion

The three-Justice dissent, authored by Justice Souter, chose to understand the approval role of the Secretary under the IMLA in a more
historical context and drew on case law supporting the view that the
approval role of the Secretary was “supposed to satisfy the National
Government’s trust responsibility to the Indians.”89 Justice Souter
thought that trust duties were imposed on the Secretary, even in his
approval role, and pointed out that the IMLA’s scheme was “reminiscent of the old allotment legislation,” where the responsibilities of
82. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2006).
83. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 509.
84. Id. at 503 (quoting United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 218
(1983)).
85. Id. at 506.
86. Id. at 507.
87. Id. at 508.
88. Id. at 511; see also supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (explaining the concurring opinion in the Federal Circuit).
89. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 515 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Sunderland v. United
States, 266 U.S. 226, 233 (1924); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310–11
(1911)).
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leasing were divided between the tribe and the government, and the
only significant difference between the two was that negotiating responsibilities had been shifted to the tribe.90
Taking issue with the majority opinion, the dissent pointed out
that the “Secretary’s own IMLA regulations (now in effect) provide
that administrative actions, including lease approvals, are to be taken
‘[i]n the best interest of the Indian mineral owner.’ ”91 Although the
dissent recognized that the regulations were not in effect at the time
the improper actions were taken, they helped to reveal the context of
the IMLA and added weight to a similar internal policy that was in
effect at all relevant times.92 The dissent also made clear that the
opinion only involved whether the claim was allowed to go forward
under the Indian Tucker Act; thus, it did not seek to establish the
proper balance between the competing purposes of the IMLA—to maximize tribal revenues and further tribal self-determination—or to determine what ultimate damages should have been awarded.93
D.

United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct.
1547 (2009)
1.

Procedural History on Remand

Since the Supreme Court in Navajo I found “no warrant from any
relevant statute or regulation to conclude that [the Secretary’s] conduct implicated a duty enforceable in an action for damages under the
Indian Tucker Act,”94 the possibility of any further action seemed
slight. In order to defeat an outright dismissal, the Navajo tribe was
left to argue that, although the Supreme Court’s opinion foreclosed
the possibility of any liability resulting from the IMLA or IMDA, the
opinion did not decide whether the tribe’s claims were cognizable
under the Indian Tucker Act because of a “network” of other statutes
that were not discussed in previous appeals.95 For its part, the government argued both that the decision in Navajo I foreclosed any further consideration of the matter and, if it did not, that the tribe had
waived any subsequent consideration of the network theory.96 The
Federal Circuit decided that the language seeming to end the case in
Navajo I should have been read in the context of the decision, which
was most concerned with the effect of the IMLA, and also involved
90. Id. at 516.
91. Id. (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2002)); see also id. at 508 n.12 (majority opinion)
(disagreeing with the applicability of 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, since the regulation had
not yet been promulgated at times relevant to this case).
92. Id. at 517 & n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 517–18.
94. Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
95. Navajo Nation v. United States, 347 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
96. Id.
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consideration of the IMDA and 25 U.S.C. § 399 but did not consider
other statutes and regulations.97 The Federal Circuit was therefore
satisfied to remand to the Court of Federal Claims the issue of waiver
and any subsequent consideration of the network theory.98 Rather
than dissenting from the decision to remand for further proceedings,
the dissent instead argued that consideration of the IMLA would be
appropriate in the network theory and strongly foreshadowed the
eventual Federal Circuit opinion that sought to align the case more
closely with Mitchell II, both in reasoning and in posture.99
On remand, the Court of Federal Claims held that the tribe did not
waive consideration of the network theory, both because the Court
had considered and rejected the argument in the original case, and
because the theory was a question of law, which mitigated the policy
of refusing to decide issues not raised in the first instance.100 Furthermore, since the decision addressed the Indian Tucker Act, a jurisdictional statute, the Court held that it would have been free on its
own motion to examine the network theory, since under the federal
rules a court can inquire into its jurisdiction at any time.101 Of
course, the decision that the tribe had not waived the network argument did not defeat the fact that the Court of Federal Claims had already considered that argument—with the IMLA as its main
centerpiece.102 Accordingly, the Court of Federal claims found the
network theory even less persuasive when consideration of the IMLA
was removed.103
Once again, the Court of Federal Claims was overturned on appeal
to the Federal Circuit.104 The opinion went to great lengths to square
the case with Mitchell II, even without the inclusion of the IMLA, and
held the government to have exercised such comprehensive control
that a denial of liability would “allow the government to have it both
ways.”105 The Federal Circuit first disposed of a few elements of the
“network”106 of statutes and regulations relied on by the tribe as not
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1332–34 (Newman, J., dissenting in part).
Navajo Nation v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 805, 808 (2005), rev’d, 501 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009).
Id. at 810–11.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 815.
Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129
S. Ct. 1547 (2009).
Id. at 1336.
The network of statutes and regulations presented to the Federal Circuit is perhaps the most complete account of the tribe’s claims on remand. These sources
included: “(i) the Treaty with the Navajo (‘Treaty of 1849’), Sept. 9, 1849, 9 Stat.
974; (ii) the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of
Indians (‘Treaty of 1868’), Aug. 12, 1868, 15 Stat. 667; (iii) Exec. Order of May 17,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3dr\NEB303.txt

552

unknown

Seq: 15

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

15-MAR-11

9:38

[Vol. 89:538

providing any substantive law which would support jurisdiction.107
The remaining statutes and regulations were found to support jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act in five subparts of the opinion.108
Apparently satisfied that it had “train[ed] on specific rights-creating
or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions,” the Federal
Circuit announced both a breach of the specific duties contained in the
network and breaches of common law duties of care, candor, and loyalty.109 Once again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.110
2.

Majority and Concurring Opinions

As a threshold matter, the Court considered the propriety of the
actions taken by the lower courts on remand and found that the previous decision did not completely nullify the possibility of another statute or regulation granting jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker
Act.111 However, the Court made it quite clear that it believed it had
decided the case correctly the first time by stating that Navajo I “left
no room for that result based on the sources of law that the Court of

107.
108.

109.
110.
111.

1884 (‘Executive Order of 1884’); (iv) the Act of June 14, 1934 (‘Act of 1934’), ch.
521, 48 Stat. 960; (v) the Act of April 17, 1950 (‘Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of
1950’), ch. 92, 64 Stat. 44, 25 U.S.C. §§ 631–40; (vi) the Indian lands section, 30
U.S.C. § 1300, of the Act of August 3, 1977 (‘Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977’), Pub. L. No. 95–87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.); (vii) the regulations, 25 C.F.R. Part 216 Subpart
B (1987) and 30 C.F.R. Part 750 (1987), promulgated pursuant to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977; and (viii) the Act of January 12,
1983 (‘Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1983’), 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1701–57, and its implementing regulations, 30 C.F.R. Parts 212, 216, and 218
(1987), and 30 C.F.R. Part 206 Subpart F (1989)” as well as “(ix) the policies of
the Department of the Interior; (x) the provisions of Lease 8580; (xi) the Act of
February 5, 1948 (‘Indian Lands Rights-of-Way Act of 1948’), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 323–28, and its implementing regulations, 25 C.F.R. Part 169 (1987); and (xii)
the IMLA of 1938 and its implementing regulations.” Id. at 1336–37 (footnote
omitted).
Id. at 1338–40 (disposing of elements (ix) through (xii), supra note 106).
See id. at 1340–45. For the sake of brevity, it is unnecessary to go into much
detail with respect to these subparts. Elements (i) through (iv), supra note 106,
are discussed as providing the necessary trust relationship and language in subpart 1; element (v), supra note 106, shows the level of control over coal resource
planning in subpart 2; elements (vi) and (vii), supra note 106, show the control of
coal mining operations in subpart 3; element (viii), supra note 106, shows the
control of the management and collection of coal royalties in subpart 4; finally,
the level of actual control over coal leasing is discussed in subpart 5 by the Federal Circuit, which found that the government cited “no authority for the proposition that control over the greater (e.g., coal resources) does not imply control over
the lesser (e.g., leasing of such coal) in the Indian Tucker Act context.” Id. at
1343.
Id. at 1346.
United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008).
United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1555 (2009).
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Appeals relied upon.”112 After rather summarily dismissing some of
the specific statutory provisions relied upon by the Federal Circuit to
find jurisdiction,113 the Court turned to the issue of the government’s
comprehensive control over coal and found that the Federal Circuit
should not have gotten to this point in the analysis.114 Instead, the
Court described that “[i]f a
plaintiff identifies such a prescription, and if that prescription
bears the hallmarks of a ‘conventional fiduciary relationship,’ then
trust principles (including any such principles premised on ‘control’)
could play a role in ‘inferring that the trust obligation [is] enforceable
by damages.’ ”115 The concurring opinion, at only two sentences, adds
little more than regret that Navajo I turned out the way it did.116
III. ANALYSIS
Navajo II foreclosed the possibility of finding jurisdiction in this
case, and in many respects it implicitly rejected the reasoning of
Mitchell II. The simple fact that the network theory of jurisdiction did
not include consideration of the IMLA along with the other statutes
that could make a specific trust duty requiring compensation meant
that Navajo II was not so subject to the reasoning of Mitchell II. The
Court’s opinion, however, shows that the level of specificity required
to invoke jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act requires something
more than a limited trust relationship coupled with any level of control over Indian resources. At the very least, the Court’s mandate in
Navajo I to “train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions”117 was at odds with the chain of reasoning in Mitchell II and was more in line with the dissent in that
case.
A.

Legal Reasoning

Without the help of the IMLA to add some weight to the argument
that any of the statutes examined in Navajo II were rights-creating or
duty-imposing in nature, the Court disposed of each statute at issue
with very little fanfare. The relevancy of § 635(a) of the Navajo–Hopi
Rehabilitation Act of 1950 was of no help for the simple fact that the
terms of the lease at issue conformed with the language of the IMLA,
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1555–57; see also infra Part III (discussing the Court’s dismissal of the
specific statutory sections in more detail).
114. Navajo II, 129 S. Ct. at 1558.
115. Id. (citation omitted) (citing United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537
U.S. 465, 473, 477 (2003)).
116. Id. at 1558 (Souter, J., concurring).
117. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003).
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rather than the Rehabilitation Act.118 However, the Court rejected
this argument on almost purely technical grounds, because § 635(a)
only provided for a lease renewal of twenty-five years, while the lease
provided for renewals as long as minerals were produced in paying
quantities.119 The Court might have been better served by focusing
on the reasoning in Navajo I with respect to the IMLA and by pointing
out that § 635(a) created the same limited approval role for the Secretary.120 Be that as it may, under either line of reasoning, § 635(a)
would not provide a specific right or duty.
The Court disposed of § 638 of the Navajo–Hopi Rehabilitation Act
because the statute, although imposing duties on the Secretary, applied to surveys and studies of Indian mineral wealth rather than
leases of that wealth.121 The Court’s reasoning on this point is sound.
Since the only acts complained of were the Secretary’s actions in approving amendments to the lease, duties arising with respect to
surveys and studies of Indian coal are clearly inapplicable. Finally,
the Court examined the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA)122 and concluded that the SMCRA did not apply,
since by its terms the Act only applied to leases “issued after August 3,
1977,”123 and, in any case, a fair interpretation of the Act only imposed a duty on the Secretary to enforce amendments pertaining to
environmental protection if requested by the tribe.124
Following the denial of any enforceable duties under the statutes
just mentioned, the Court proceeded to discuss the role, if any, that
comprehensive control over Indian resources might play. It was at
this point that the Court implicitly rejected the reasoning of the majority in Mitchell II and instead provided an analysis more in line with
the dissent in that case. While the majority in Mitchell II was satisfied to point out that “a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when
the Government assumes such elaborate control over . . . property belonging to Indians,”125 the majority decision in Navajo II instead held
that “neither the Government’s ‘control’ over coal nor common-law
trust principles matter.”126 Indeed, this statement should have come
as a surprise to anyone following this case, since the posture of the
118. Section 635(a) dealt with the disposition of lands and allowed for the leasing of
Indian land, but only for public, religious, educational, recreational or business
purposes. 25 U.S.C. § 635(a) (1950).
119. Navajo II, 129 S. Ct. at 1556.
120. Both statutes provided that the relevant groups may execute leases subject to
approval by the Secretary.
121. Navajo II, 129 S. Ct. at 1557.
122. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 101, 91
Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)).
123. 30 U.S.C. § 1300(e) (2006).
124. Navajo II, 129 S. Ct. at 1557.
125. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
126. Navajo II, 129 S. Ct. at 1558.
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case made it seem that “whether Congress ha[d] assigned control over
an Indian resource”127 was the major question for resolution of the
case and would in turn depend on the interpretation given to the relevant statutes and regulations.128
B.

Toward the Future

Navajo II does more than confirm suspicions that the Roberts
Court would “interpret precedent and statutes governing the federal–state–tribal relationship as narrowly as, or perhaps more narrowly than, the Rehnquist Court.”129 Instead, it shows the Roberts
Court construing precedent so narrowly that the language used becomes non-existent. Had the Court held otherwise—that control over
an Indian resource and trust principles mattered in the slightest degree—the Court would have been forced to deal with the argument
that, since the Secretary of the Interior had the power of approval over
the lease amendments, he could have exercised effective control over
those resources.
This decision further proves the existence of a “decisional dichotomy for trust claims against the Executive,” but modifies the dichotomy to apply exclusively to the management of tribal resources as
opposed to any level of control over those resources.130 To be fair, the
decisional dichotomy was in fact expressed in terms of management
rather than control of tribal resources,131 but one wonders whether
the upside of dichotomy132 has any real teeth left. Of course, the
downside remains that federal law determines when a duty is present,133 and this might now be compounded by the simple fact that it
is likely easier for the both the legislative branch and the executive
branch to exercise control over resources through similar approval arrangements without expressly assuming management duties. Furthermore, with any level of control now regarded as immaterial, the
Supreme Court’s “increasing willingness to hold the executive accountable” might in fact be beginning to ebb under the Roberts
Court.134
127. Perdue, supra note 4, at 529; see also Sisk, supra note 4, at 325 (stating that the
level of control over Indian resources determines the level of governmental duties
owed) (citing Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
128. Perdue, supra note 4, at 529.
129. Id. at 527–28.
130. Davies, supra note 2, at 315.
131. Id. at 315–16.
132. In other words, the upside is that “both tribes and individual Indians may rely on
the trust to seek compensation.” Id. at 316.
133. Id.
134. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 40 (3d ed. 1998).
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There are, of course, other factual distinctions between these two
cases that make each decision supportable in its own right. For example, the network of statutes relied upon in Mitchell II was much more
comprehensive, and at least a few of the sections dealt with collection
and payment of monies to the tribe or individual allottees of timber
land and authorized the Secretary to actually sell resources, rather
than approve a sale or lease.135 In contrast, the network of statutes in
Navajo II gave the Secretary a much more limited approval role, even
if the Court had analyzed the IMLA as part of this network. However,
the reasoning in Navajo II was foreshadowed by the dissent in Mitchell II, when Justice Powell reiterated the “general principle that a
cause of action for damages against the United States ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’ ”136 Rather than focusing
on the actual level of control, the opinion claimed that this part of the
analysis should not have been reached because the statutes and regulations at issue did not rise to the level of specificity bearing the
“hallmarks of a ‘conventional fiduciary relationship.’ ”137 By using
this reasoning, the Court in Navajo II was able to neatly sidestep the
matter of whether the Secretary’s limited approval role amounted to
comprehensive control over the lease at issue and instead focus on
whether the network theory provided the requisite level of specificity
to support jurisdiction for a damages claim.
It is in this sense that the Court implicitly overruled Mitchell II,
since there was no commentary on the real basis for reversal found by
the Federal Circuit. It is quite obvious from a reading of the Federal
Circuit’s opinion in Navajo Nation v. United States138 that the Federal
Circuit was attempting to bring the controversy within the ambit of
Mitchell II. By beginning with a discussion of a source of limited trust
responsibilities, namely the Treaties of 1849139 and 1868140 among
other statutes, the opinion closely mirrors the limited trust relationship formed by the General Allotment Act in both Mitchell I and
Mitchell II. The Federal Circuit then moved on to a discussion of statutes and regulations that tended to show that the government had
been exercising comprehensive control over Navajo coal.141 All of this
135. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, §§ 7–8, 36 Stat. 857 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 406–407 (2006)).
136. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 228–29 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980)).
137. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1558 (2009) (citation
omitted).
138. Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
139. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
U.S.-Navajo Tribe, Sept. 9, 1849, 9 Stat. 974.
140. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
U.S.-Navajo Tribe, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
141. Navajo Nation, 501 F.3d at 1341–45.
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was meant to show the elaborate nature of the government’s role in
approving the lease and thereby “establish a fiduciary relationship
and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary
responsibilities.”142
It may be accurate to say that trends identified in the 1980s that
would “leave Indian tribes in the unhappy position they were in during the six decades before the trust law victories”143 have finally come
to fruition. Navajo II lends support to the proposition that “the same
standard of statutory explicitness [will] be used to delineate the nature and scope of any alleged trust obligation of the federal government.”144 This is so because the Court was unwilling to hold in both
Navajo I and II that even a limited trust relationship was created by
the statutes at issue,145 showing the intent of the Court to interpret
statutes narrowly with respect to the creation of a trust duty. This
could indeed have serious effects on tribal claimants seeking even equitable relief from alleged wrongdoings, and it could result in “the government manag[ing] most of their assets and resources, often without
explicit statutory authorization, yet [not being] held strictly accountable for mismanagement, either through legal or equitable
remedies.”146
Given the complex and contradictory nature of the various holdings comprising the full procedural history of this case, an attempt to
place the decision in context as a political, rather than judicial, decision would seem especially fruitful at this stage.147 A very important
aspect of the case, at least for establishing political resistance to a
finding in favor of the tribe, is the simple fact that possible recovery
could have been in the vicinity of $600 million.148 This, however,
would not have been the total cost to non-Indians, since the coal mined
by Peabody was used to produce electricity throughout the southwestern United States, and any increase in production costs would have
resulted in higher electric bills in the region.149 Furthermore, while
not explicitly mentioned in higher levels of review, the negotiation
142. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983).
143. Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal–Indian Trust Relationship After
Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 644 (1982).
144. Id.
145. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1558 (2009); United
States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003).
146. Newton, supra note 143, at 644. Perhaps in the context of this case, “control”
should be substituted for “management,” but such semantics will make little difference in terms of the possibility of these claimants being granted legal or equitable relief (and “mis-control” just doesn’t have the same ring).
147. See WILKINS, supra note 3, at 8.
148. Navajo I, 537 U.S at 500. Little else can be said other than that the sheer
amount of money involved could make more conservative judges cringe.
149. In fact, several companies appealed the original rate adjustment, and there was
evidence of other attempted ex parte contacts by these companies during the orig-
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process following the improper ex parte communications between Hodel and Hulett affirmed the validity of tribal taxation and provided for
payment of back royalties.150
The mineral wealth on reservations is well known and includes
about a “quarter of the readily accessible low sulfur coal” that the
United States claims as its own.151 This has led to the political pressures driving both extensive development and former (and perhaps
current) abuses of royalty rate setting and approval.152 Nothing in
the facts of this case would seem to suggest that these pressures are
less salient in this dispute than they have historically been in other
circumstances. Cynics might argue—perhaps with some merit—that
when corporate profits of large electricity providers are at stake, electrical companies may respond by applying pressure to any part of the
political system that can be reached.
While from the legal perspective this case could be said to represent yet another instance of “chiseling away at the cornerstones of
Indian law,”153 from a political perspective the process resembles geologic change more than a man-made shaping of rock. The problem is
that leaving the determination in the hands of political actors has
risks.154 In deciding this case, the Supreme Court has expanded,
rather than contracted, the making of Indian policy by political
branches, a system that led to such controversial policies as allotment
and termination.155 As a result, while the “conflicting interests represented in leasing of Indian lands . . . are almost certain to be a continuing subject of dispute,”156 the balance of power to determine when
fiduciary duties arise has shifted to the political branches.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether the Court’s reasoning in Navajo II shows an implicit overturning of Mitchell II is unclear because the opinion itself fails to rec-

150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

inal rate adjustment appeals process. Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed.
Cl. 217, 222 (2000).
Id. at 223–24. This could lead to a “no harm, no foul” view in that the tribe, while
not getting the explicit rate it desired, nevertheless received more than a bare
12.5% royalty rate in the negotiation process. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the tribe’s receipt of a lower royalty rate in one instance,
higher rates for two other leases, and taxation power as a result of a negotiated
agreement).
WARD CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 154 (2003).
Id. at 155.
Perdue, supra note 4, at 526.
David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 353
(2001).
Id. at 353–54.
CANBY, supra note 134, at 365–66.
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ognize that the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Court of
Federal Claims almost exclusively by attempting to fit the network of
statutes into the same scheme as Mitchell II. Furthermore, the Court
made absolutely no mention of how, or whether, the Treaties of 1849
and 1868 affected the existence of even a limited trust relationship
between the tribe and the United States with respect to coal leasing,
or whether control over Indian resources and trust principals would
matter under such a limited trust relationship. What is clear is that
this dispute is no longer the vehicle to ask these questions.
As evidenced by the wide array of opinions in Navajo II’s procedural history, this area of the law remains full of conflicting statements.
While one might not agree with the views of the Federal Circuit or the
Supreme Court, both were able to use legal precedent and reasoning
to arrive at widely divergent positions. It is exactly in situations of
this kind that political pressures, rather than legal reasoning, are able
to affect outcomes. It was probable that the Roberts Court would approach this case with an eye toward more narrow interpretations of
the law, and it was exactly this view that allowed the Court to avoid
the contention that approval can amount to control and in fact did
amount to control in this case. By inherently shifting the Mitchell II
focus to management, both the executive and the legislative branches
will be able to more predictably avoid monetary damages arising out
of their relationship with native peoples.
Facially, at least, this case came out the way it did because the
scheme of statutes and regulations tipped the scales more heavily in
favor of tribal self-determination rather than government duties.
What would the Navajo say is more important to self-determination:
management or control? The Court weighed in essentially to say that
only management of tribal resources can show that the regulatory
scheme was meant to trump tribal self-determination and impose
trust duties on the government, but control by a regulatory scheme
poses no hurdle to self-determination. The effectiveness of the ex
parte communications that lie at the heart of this dispute shows that
control over a resource is just as destructive to tribal self-determination, and the power to deny implies a great deal of control.
While it remains true that one lesson tribal claimants should have
learned is to press all aspects of a network theory of trust duties at all
stages of litigation,157 a new caveat should be kept in mind. Although
structurally a network can show the extensive nature of the government’s control over a resource, and factually that control can be determinative of a given outcome, without a clear statement of government

157. Perdue, supra note 4, at 529.
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management duties “neither the Government’s ‘control’ over coal nor
common-law trust principles matter.”158

158. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1558 (2009).

